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Abstract
We derive a closed form solution for an optimal control problem related to an interbank lending schemes subject to terminal
probability constraints on the failure of banks which are interconnected through a financial network. The derived solution
applies to a real banks network by obtaining a general solution when the aforementioned probability constraints are assumed for
all the banks. We also present a direct method to compute the systemic relevance parameter for each bank within the network.
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1 Introduction
Starting from the worldwide crisis of 2007-2008, finan-
cial analysts, bank practitioners, applied mathemati-
cians and economists, have been pushed to rethink the
models they were used to work with, changing a series of
assumptions turned out to be too far from real markets.
Under this need for more robust mathematical model, a
major focus has been put on default probabilities that
any financial entity must face. Such credit risk analysis
has seen an increasing interest in the theoretical finan-
cial community, pushing the development of mathemat-
ically rigorous models which take into account both the
risk exposure factor and related default events.
Following above mentioned interest, we consider in
the present work a network of interconnected financial
entities and, following [6], we consider a financial super-
visor, usually referred as lender of last resort (LOLR)
aiming at guarantee the wellness of the financial net-
work, by lending money to those agents who are near
to default. The main novelty of our approach is that we
assume fixed probability constraints of non defaulting
the banks have to satisfy at a specific terminal time.
From a financial point of view, such constraint implies
that the LOLR optimal strategy has to be derived satis-
fying the assumption that each bank is characterized by
a probability of bankruptcy. As in [13], we assume that
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a bank may fail only at a fixed terminal time, namely it
goes under bankruptcy if, at terminal time, its wealth is
below a given threshold. We remark that we assume the
default event to be triggered as soon as the value of the
financial entity reaches an endogenous lower threshold,
so that the default time results in being a predictable
stopping time with respect to the reference filtration,
see, e.g., [1,2,13,14].
Using techniques related to stochastic target prob-
lems, see, [3–5,17], we will be able to derive an ad
hoc Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the
related optimal control providing also a closed form
solution. Derived results will be applied to a concrete
example. We remark that, for the sake of clarity, we will
consider a small set of interconnected banks, the case
of larger network being of easy derivation being the
solution expressed in closed form. Also, a systematic ap-
proach to quantify the relative importance of each single
player in the network, based on a page rank approach
first introduced in [15], will be derived. This quantity
will be then used to decide the admitted probability of
each bank’s failure, requiring that important banks have
larger non-failure probability, hence adopting a too big
to fail paradigma.
The present work is organized as follows: in Section
2 we introduce the main setting; in Section 3 we in-
troduce the optimal control problem with probability
constraints and we provide its solution; in Section 4 we
present the Pagerank method for the relative impor-
tance of the banks in the network and we apply the
derived results to a toy example.
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2 The general setting
Following the financial network setting proposed in
[11,16], see appendix A for further details, we consider
a network composed by n nodes, each of them repre-
senting a different financial agent, and we denote by
Xi(t) the asset value of the ith agent at time t ∈ [0, T ],
being T <∞ a fixed positive terminal time. Each node
may have nominal liabilities to other nodes directly
connected with it. In this case, we denote by Li,j(t) the
payment that the bank i owes to the bank j, at time
t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, we introduce the time-dependent lia-
bilities matrix L(t) = (Li,j(t))n×n, being Li,j(t) 6= 0 for
ι+i,j 6= 0, where, as shown in appendix A, ι+i,j is equal to
one if i and j are connected, while it equals zero oth-
erwise. In particular, L(t) explicitly states that there
cannot be any cash flow between any two banks which
are not edge-connected.
We will denote by ui(t) the payment made at time
t ∈ [0, T ] by the ith bank, whereas u¯i(t) =
∑n
j=1 Li,j(t)
is the total nominal obligation of node i towards all other
nodes. Therefore, if u¯i(t) = ui(t), then i has satisfied all
its liabilities. We also introduce the relative liabilities
matrix Π(t) = (pii,j(t)) defined as Li,j(t)/u¯i(t)1u¯i(t)>0.
The matrix Π(t) is row stochastic, in the sense that∑n
j=1 pii,j(t) = 1, so that pii,j(t) represents the propor-
tion of the total debt at time t that the node i owes to
the node j.
Similarly, we can define the cash inflow of the node i
as the sum of the exogenous cash inflow F i(t) plus the
total payment that node i receives at time t by other
nodes, that is
∑n
j=1 pi
T
i,j(t)uj(t) , where we denoted the
transposed of the relative liabilities matrix and its ele-
ments as ΠT = (piTi,j(t)). We thus have that the value of
the ith node at time t ∈ [0, T ] is given by
V¯ i(t) =
n∑
j=1
piTi,j(t)uj(t) + F
i(t)− u¯i(t) , (1)
see Appendix A for a formal financial treatment of the
network. Following [12], we assume the liabilities be-
tween banks to evolve according the following equation
d
dt
Li,j(t) = µijLi,j(t) , (2)
We also assume that the bank i, at any time t, invests
the difference between cash inflow ans cash outflow in
an exogenous asset Xi(t) whose dynamic is given by
dXi(t) = Xi(t)
(
µi dt+ σi dW
i(t)
)
, i = 1, . . . , n .
Moreover, see [12], we introduce continuous (determin-
istic) default boundaries as Xi(t) ≤ vi(t), P a.s. with
vi(t) :=
{
Ri
(
u¯i(t)−
∑n
j=1 pi
T
i,j(t) u¯j(t)
)
t < T ,
u¯i(t)−
∑n
j=1 pi
T
i,j(t) u¯j(t) t = T ,
(3)
where Ri ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, . . . , n, are suitable constants
representing the recovery rate of the bank i.
3 The stochastic optimal control with probabil-
ity constraints
The present Section introduces the mathematical formu-
lation of the main problem, expressing it as an optimal
control problem with terminal probability constraint.
Furthermore, we provide an analytic solution which al-
lows us to compute the optimal controls.
In what follows we consider a complete filtered proba-
bility space
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0 ,P
)
satisfying usual assump-
tions, namely right–continuity and saturation by P–null
sets. Following [6], we focus our attention on the actions
played by a financial supervisor, called Lender Of Last
Resort (LOLR), connected to any node belonging to the
financial network. In particular, the LOLR aims at sav-
ing the network from default, ant it is assumed to have
full information about the network state. Therefore, at
any time t the LOLR can lend money to the bank i,
i = 1, . . . , n, so that the controlled evolution of the bank
i satisfies
dXiα(t) =
(
µiXiα(t) + α
i(t)
)
dt+ σiX
i
α(t)dW
i(t) , (4)
being αi(t) the loan from the LOLR to the bank i, at
time t ∈ [0, T ]. Also we assume αi(t) to have values
in a compact set U i ⊂ R and we define Ai the set of
U i−valued measurable processes. We will also employ
the notation U := U1×· · ·×Un andA := A1×· · ·×An.
Accordingly, the LOLR aims at minimizing lend re-
sources
J(t, α) = E
[
1
2
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
αi(s)
2 ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft] (5)
under the probabilistic constraint
P
(
Xi(T ) ≥ vi|Ft
) ≥ qi , i = 1, . . . , n , (6)
for suitable constants qi ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, . . . , n.
3.1 Reduction to a stochastic target problem
The current section formally introduces the Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation associated to the con-
trol problem defined in equation (5), subject to con-
straint given by equation (6). Let us underline that, in
what follows and due to the structure of the optimal con-
trol problem, we will focus on a single agent i. In partic-
ular, to avoid heavy notation, we will denote for short
X := Xi.
Recalling that the terminal probability in equation (6)
can be rewritten as an expectation, namely
P
(
X(T ) ≥ v ∣∣ Ft) = E [1{X(T )≥v} ∣∣ Ft] ,
then we have the following.
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Lemma 1 Given the stochastic optimal control prob-
lem with terminal probability constraint (6), the terminal
probability constraints holds if and only if there exists an
adapted sub-martingale (P (s))s∈[t,T ] such that
P (t) = q , P (T ) ≤ 1{X(T )≥v} .
Proof. We first prove (⇐): since P (s) is a sub-
martingale, then
E
[
1{X(T )≥v}
] ≥ E [P (T ) |Ft] ≥ P (t) = q .
To prove the converse (⇒), let us denote
q0 := E
[
1{Xs(T )≥v}
]
,
P (s) := E
[
1{Xs(T )≥v}
∣∣Fs]− (q0 − q) ,
where Xs represents the solution with initial time s ∈
[t, T ]. Then P is an adapted martingale and the claim
follows.
When the probability constraint is active, the sub-
martingale P is given by
P i(s) = E
[
1{Xi(T )≥vi}
∣∣Fs] ,
hence P i turns out to be an adapted martingale, imply-
ing the new state variable
P i(s) = qi +
∫ T
t
αiP (s) dW (s) , (7)
where αiP , taking values in R, is a square integrableFs−adapted stochastic processes representing the new
control. It is worth emphasizing that αiP is not bounded
a priori being derived from the martingale representa-
tion theorem. In accordance to the used notation we will
denote by αP the n−dimensional vector whose compo-
nents are αiP .
Exploiting the geometric dynamic programming princi-
ple, see [17], we can define the following value function
V (t, x, q) = inf
{
1
2
Et
[ n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
αi(s)2 ds
]
s.t.
1{Xi(T )≥vi} − P i(T ) ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , n P a.s.
}
,
(8)
where Et is the conditional expectation w.r.t. vFt.
The Hamiltonian for the related unconstrained optimal
control is
HX(x, α, p,Qx) = (µx+ α) · p+ 1
2
σ2 x2Qx +
1
2
‖α‖2 ,
(9)
where we have denoted by
µx := (µ1x1, . . . , µnxn) ,
and
σ2 x2 = diag((σ1x1)2, . . . , (σnxn)2) ,
being diag the n× n diagonal matrix.
Intuitively, when the terminal constraint is satisfied, the
associated HJB equation, whose Hamiltonian is given in
equation (9), can be solved, being α ≡ 0 the optimal
control.
Taking into account the processP along with the original
state variable X, the constrained Hamiltonian can be
defined as
H(X,P )(x, α, p,Qx, αP , Qxq, Qq) = (10)
= (µx+ α)p+
1
2
σ2x2Q+
1
2
‖α‖2 + σxQxqαP + 1
2
α2PQq ,
which should play the role of the Hamiltonian of the as-
sociated problem when the constraint is binding. There-
fore, the HJB associated to the optimal control reads as
follow
− ∂tV
− inf
α∈A
inf
αP∈Rn
H(X,P )(x, α, ∂xV, ∂
2
xV, αP , ∂
2
xqV, ∂
2
qV ) = 0 ,
and the following holds
H(X,P )(x, α, p,Qx, αP , Qxq, Qq) ≥ HX(x, α, p,Qx) ,
allowing to evaluate the minimum of H(X,P ) w.r.t. αP ,
by a first order optimality condition as to have
αP = −σ x Qxq
Qq
,
which, when plugged into equation (10), gives the fol-
lowing minimum for H(X,P )
inf
αP∈Rn
H(X,P ) = H¯(x, α, p,Qx, Qxq, Qq) = (11)
=

(µx+ α)p+ 1
2
σ2x2Qx +
1
2
‖α‖2 − 1
2Qq
σ2x2Q2xq Qq > 0 ,
(µx+ α)p+ 1
2
σ2x2Qx +
1
2
‖α‖2 Qq = 0 ,
−∞ otherwise .
It follows that the associated value function, see equa-
tion (8), solves the following HJB equation
−∂tV − inf
α∈A
H¯(x, α, ∂xV, ∂
2
xV, ∂
2
xqV, ∂
2
qV ) = 0 , (12)
subject to the terminal condition
V (T, x, q) =
{
0 x ≥ v ,
∞ otherwise ,
where the Hamiltonian H¯ is defined as in equation (11).
3.2 The affine control case
In order to obtain a closed form solution for the HJB
equation (11) we will further assume that the admissible
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controls are of the form
αi(t) = ψi(t)Xi(t) , (13)
for ψi(t) ∈ [0,Ψ], Ψ ∈ R+ ∪{∞}. We remark that, from
a financial perspective, this implies that the LOLR can
decide the interest rate at which the banks assets ac-
crues, allowing the bank to have a higher interest rate
to lower the probability of failure.
Given the structure of the optimal control prob-
lem, we can analyse each node i separately, where
we ansatz the value function to be of the form
V (t, x, q) =
∑n
i=1 V
i(t, xi, qi), where each V i is re-
garded as the value function for the optimal problem
with respect to the element i. Thus, for each player i
we compute the solution to the above problem in terms
of contour line of a function γi(t, x, q), defining first the
boundaries of the domain for the value function V i,
then computing explicitly the contour line on the inte-
rior of the domain.
The first region Γ0 is the region in which the constraint
is not binding, implying that the optimal control is given
by ψ ≡ 0. Financially speaking, whenever the value of
the bank lies within the region Γ0, the bank satisfies the
LOLR requirement regarding survival probability.
In the second region ΓΨ the optimal control exceed the
maximum rate Ψ the LOLR is willing to grant, imply-
ing that the terminal constraint is not satisfied and the
value function V diverges. The last domain, denoted by
Γ, is characterized by a binding terminal constraint, and
here the optimal control ψ ∈ (0,Ψ) has to be explicitly
computed. Similarly, we will denote by γ0, resp. γΨ, the
switching region between Γ0 and Γ, resp. between Γ and
ΓΨ.
We thus have the following result.
Proposition 2 Consider the optimal control problem
(8), then the three regions introduced above are defined as
ΓΨ =
{
(t, x) :
(
σ2
2
− µ
)
+
log v(T )
x
T − t −
σρ√
T − t > Ψ
}
(14)
Γ0 =
{
(t, x) :
(
σ2
2
− µ
)
+
log v(T )
x
T − t −
σρ√
T − t < 0
}
(15)
Γ =
{
(t, x) : 0 <
(
σ2
2
− µ
)
+
log v(T )
x
T − t −
σρ√
T − t < Ψ
}
,
(16)
with
ρ :=
√
2 Erf−1 (1− 2q¯) .
Proof. Consider first ΓΨ and define the highest reachable
probability for the i−th node as
WH(t, x) := sup {q : V (t, x, q) <∞} =
= sup
ψ∈[0,Ψ]
P
(
Xt,x;ψ(T ) ≥ v(T )) ,
where Xt,x;ψ(T ) denotes the value at time T with initial
datum (t, x) and control ψ ∈ [0,Ψ]. It follows that the
highest reachable probability is attained when consider-
ing the maximum admissible control Ψ <∞. Therefore,
by Itoˆ formula and the Feynman–Kac theorem, we have
that WH(t, x) solves the parabolic PDE
WH(t, x)(T, x) = 1{[v(T ),∞)}(x) ,
−∂tWH(t, x) = ∂xWH(t, x) (µ+ Ψ)x+
+ 1
2
σ2x2∂2xW
H(t, x) ,
whose solution can be explicitly computed as follows
WH(t, x) = P
(
logXt,x;Ψ(T ) ≥ log v(T )
)
=
= P
(
W (T − t) ≥ 1
σ
(
log
v(T )
x
−
(
µ+ Ψ− σ
2
2
)
(T − t)
))
=
=
1
2
(1− Erf (d(µ,Ψ, σ, T − t)) , (17)
with
d(µ,Ψ, σ, T − t) :=
log v(T )
x
−
(
µ+ Ψ− σ2
2
)
(T − t)√
2σ2(T − t) ,
and Erf denotes the error function. For WH(t, x) =
q¯ ∈ (0, 1), solving for Ψ, we obtain the boundary region
in implicit form
Ψ = γΨ(t, x; q¯) =
(
σ2
2
− µ
)
+
log v(T )x
T − t −
σρ√
T − t ,
(18)
with
ρ :=
√
2 Erf−1 (1− 2q¯) .
Thus, for a required success probability q¯, the control
problem is not feasible in
ΓΨ =
{
(t, x) :
(
σ2
2
− µ
)
+
log v(T )x
T − t −
σρ√
T − t > Ψ
}
,
and, for an initial data (t, x) at the left hand side of
γΨ(t, x; q¯), see equation (18), the terminal constraint
cannot be satisfied, see Figure 1. If Ψ =∞, namely the
LOLR is willing to give a possibly infinite return rate,
any point is controllable, and we can always find an ad-
missible control such that the terminal probability con-
straint is attained.
As regard Γ0, computing the no-action region we have
W 0(t, x) = P
(
Xt,x;ψ0(T ) ≥ v(T )) =
=
1
2
(1− Erf (d(µ, ψ0, σ, T − t)) ,
then, proceeding as above and solving for ψ0, we obtain
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Fig. 1. Representation of different domains for the optimal
control problem.
the boundary region
0 = γ0(t, x; q¯) =
(
σ2
2
− µ
)
+
log v(T )x
T − t −
σρ√
T − t , (19)
where
ρ :=
√
2 Erf−1 (1− 2q¯) ,
and we are again left with the following no-action region
Γ0 =
{
(t, x) :
(
σ2
2
− µ
)
+
log v(T )x
T − t −
σρ√
T − t < 0
}
so that, given a starting value (t, x) ∈ Γ0, the terminal
constraint is satisfied and the optimal return is given by
the null control ψ ≡ 0.
At last the action region Γ is the one delimited by Γ0
and ΓΨ, that is
Γ =
{
(t, x) : 0 <
(
σ2
2
− µ
)
+
log v(T )x
T − t −
σρ√
T − t < Ψ
}
.
Thus, being (t, x) ∈ Γ, the controller has to find the op-
timal control so that the terminal probability constraint
holds. By computing the reachability set with fixed con-
stant control ψ¯, we eventually obtain with arguments
analogous to the ones above,
ψ¯ = γψ¯(t, x; q¯) =
(
σ2
2
− µ
)
+
log v(T )x
T − t −
σρ√
T − t , (20)
see Figure 1 for a representation of the above obtained
regions.
Therefore, if the autonomous process Xt,x;0(T ) already
satisfies the terminal probability constraint, then it is
optimal to solve the control problem with no terminal
constraint, whose solution is given by the null control
in the present case. If instead (t, x) ∈ Γ, for a fixed
q ∈ (0, 1), the optimal control ψ is given by
γψ(t, x; q) =
(
σ2
2
− µ
)
+
log v(T )x
T − t −
σρ√
T − t = ψ , (21)
The following result holds.
Theorem 3 The value function for the optimal control
problem (8) is given by
V (t, x,W ψ¯(t, x)) =
n∑
i=1
V i(t, xi,W ψ¯
i
(t, xi)) , (22)
where
(i) if (t, xi) ∈ Γi and qi ∈ (0, 1) are such that
γψ¯i(t, x
i, q) = ψ¯i, then
V i
(
t, xi,W ψ¯
i
)
= (ψ¯i)2(xi)2
(
e(2(µ
i+ψ¯i)+(σi)2)(t−T ) − 1
2(µi + ψ¯i) + (σi)2
)
;
(23)
(ii) if (t, xi) ∈ Γi0 and qi ∈ (0, 1), then it holds
V i(t, xi, qi) = 0.
Then V , see equation (22), defines a classical solution to
the HJB equation (12) on Γ ∩ Γ0.
Moreover, the optimal control within the class of affine
controls is given as in equation (13), where ψ is given as
in equation (20)
Proof. The structure of the optimal control problem
gives that the contribute of each node can be treated
separately, so that the value function is of the form (22),
where each V i can be regarded as the value function for
the optimal control for the node i alone. As above, for
ease of notation, we will omit the index i.
Fixing the node i, it can be trivially shown that for
(t, x) ∈ Γ0, we have V (t, x, q) = 0.
Let (t, x) ∈ Γ, along the curve W ψ¯(t, x), the terminal
probability of success remains constant, so that the op-
timal control is given by the constant control ψ¯. Ex-
plicit computations shows that V as defined in equation
(23) solves the HJB equation (12). Moreover, since the
map q 7→ V (t, x, q) is non–decreasing and W ψ¯(t, x) >
Wψ(t, x) for ψ¯ > ψ, we have
V
(
t, x,Wψ(t, x)
)
= −∞ , ψ < ψ¯ ,
since the terminal constraint in equation (8) is not satis-
fied. Analogously, if ψ > ψ¯, then W ψ¯(t, x) < Wψ(t, x).
Therefore, the non-decreasing property of V w.r.t. the
third argument q, implies
V
(
t, x,Wψ(t, x)
)
> V
(
t, x,W ψ¯(t, x)
)
,
and the minimum is attained for the control ψ¯ implicitly
given by equation (21).
As regard the value function regularity, it is a classical
solution in both region Γ and Γ0. To prove that it is a
global classical solution we need to show that it is regular
on γ0. Let x¯ the value on the switching curve γ0, that is
for fixed (t, q), we have γ0(t, x¯, q) = 0, then, since ψ¯ → 0
as x → x¯−, we have limx→x¯− ∂2xV = 0 = limx→x¯+ ∂2xV
and limx→x¯− ∂xV = 0 = limx→x¯+ ∂xV , hence the value
function is differentiable on Γ ∪ Γ0.
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4 Application to a network of financial banks
In the present section we use previously obtained results
to study a real-world application characterized by an
interconnected network of banks. In particular, we will
show how optimal solutions previously computed can
modify the evolution of such a a network. We stress that,
for the sake of readability, we will apply our results to
a small network, even if, due the fact that the optimal
solution is computed in closed form, our results can be
easily extended to arbitrary big systems.
In order to apply results proved in Section 3, we need
to specify for each bank the required probability of non
defaulting. A robust and efficient method is proposed
in Appendix A.1 and it is based on the page rank no-
tion, so that exploiting the network structure the rela-
tive importance of each bank with respect to the whole
network health is estimated. We are thus considering a
LOLR willing to save banks whose failure would cause
insolvency and no ability to pay back their liabilities.
We consider a system of banks whose liability matrix
and cash vector are as follows, see Figure 2 for the asso-
ciated graph:
L =

0 0 10 0
5 0 5 5
0 0 0 0
10 4 0 0
 , X =

5.2
6
13
3
 .
As introduced in Definition 5, the associated -matrix to
above network can be computed as
Gd =

0.0375 0.8344 0.0375 2.3042
0.0375 0.0375 0.0375 0.9442
2.9352 0.8344 0.0375 0.0375
0.0375 0.8344 0.0375 0.0375
 .
The absolute value of the eigenvector corresponding to
the highest eigenvalue is
R = v1 =
[
0.3516 0.1342 0.9177 0.1275
]T
.
Note that the third bank is the one with the highest
ranking. Indeed, it is easy to note that its default would
cause the default of the first bank yielding a possible in-
solvency cascade. This is due to the fact that the third
bank is systematically more important than the others.
Notice that the amount of money due is the most impor-
tant aspect to be taken into account for the safety of the
system. We have reported in Table 1 further considera-
tions. It is worth to underline that, looking at Figure 2
and Table 1, it can be seen that although the first and
the third bank are owning the same amount of money,
their rankingsR are significantly different. This is due to
the fact that Bank 3 owns to Bank 1 and its insolvency
would probably cause the default of Bank 1. In this ex-
ample the cascade effect caused by the default of Bank 3
would stop with the default of two banks because of the
small dimension of the system, while, on the contrary,
such an effect amplifies in big networks.
Fig. 2. Graph representing the system of banks: nodes re-
port the cash value of each bank, while the oriented edges
represent the amount of money lend from a bank to another.
Banks (i) 1 2 3 4
Xi 5.2 6 13 3∑
j∼i Lji 15 4 15 5
Ri 0.3516 0.1342 0.9177 0.1275
Table 1
Comparison among the banks rankings.Ri is the rating value
associated to each bank as defined in equation (A.4).
Fig. 3. 100 simulations for the evolution of Bank 3 without
LOLR intervention (top panel) and with LOLR intervention
(bottom panel).
We recall that the aim of the LOLR is to minimize
the cost on banks bailout given by equation (5) con-
strained by (6), i.e. guaranteeing a probability qi that
the bank i will not default. Fixing an identical probabil-
ity constraint q ∈ [0, 1) for all the banks, hence adopt-
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ing an equality policy analogous to the max liquidity
(ML) strategy introduced in [6], see also appendix B.
We note that a ML strategy guarantees no privileges to
any banks, which would lead the LOLR to lend the same
amount of money for systematically important banks as
for those banks whose failure would not cause a cascad-
ing effect.
The main idea of the subsequent analysis is to general-
ize typical ML strategies to asses different probabilities
to each bank in accord to their systemic importance in
the network. Consider thus
qi = f(Ri), for f : R+ → [0, 1) increasing function ,
where, as seen in Section A.1, Ri is the ranking of the
bank i. We remark that that choice of f to be an increas-
ing function leads to a more convenient scenario for the
health of networks which have a core-periphery struc-
ture, whereas, normally, banks networks have a dense
cohesive core, with a periphery less connected, see [6].
Agreeing with above consideration, chose the following
probability constraints
qi = 0.9 + 0.051{Ri>0.5} + 0.041{Ri>0.75} . (24)
Figure 2 reports results of the LOLR control with above
derived probability of non default. For the sake of clear-
ness, we assuned that all liabilities expire at terminal
time T , and that they exponentially increase in time
with fixed growth rate r = 0.05.
Each bank value evolve according to equations (4), with
parameters
(log x10, µ
1, σ1) = (1.6, 0.2, 0.1) ,
(log x20, µ
2, σ2) = (1.79.15, 0.25) ,
(log x30, µ
3, σ3) = (2.56, 0.3, 0.2) ,
(log x40, µ
4, σ4) = (1.09, 0.05, 0.4) .
By equation (21), we have that the banks’ log-switching
regions yi, i = 1, . . . , 4, read as follow
y1 = 1.622593, y2 = 0, y3 = 2.97332, y4 = 0,
q1 = 0.9, q2 = 0.9, q3 = 0.99, q4 = 0.9 .
The LOLR has not to intervene in banks 2 and 4, since
they have more credits than debits, hence they cannot
face bankruptcy. Also, according to above derived quan-
tities, bank 1 need no intervention; nonetheless note that
choosing q1 = 0.95, would have led to y˜1 = 1.6589 with a
consequent LOLR intervention injecting money. At last
Bank 3 requires the LOLR intervention to be prevented
from default.
Figure 3 (top panel) represents 100 simulations for the
evolution of Bank 3, with and without LOLR interven-
tion. In particular, since q3 = 99% and the default prob-
ability of Bank 3 is 0.38, the LOLR is going to inject
capital into its cash reserve. After the optimal injection
of capital, Bank 3 has probability 0.01 to face default,
see lower Figure 3, for the representation of 100 simula-
tions in the case in which the LOLR intervenes.
5 Conclusions
In the present work, we have derived a closed form so-
lution for an optimal control of interbank lending sub-
ject to specific terminal probability constraints on the
failure. We have also shown a simple and direct method
to derive the relative importance of any node within the
network. It is worth stressing that such a ranking value
is fundamental in deciding the accepted probability of
failure which modifies the final optimal strategy of a fi-
nancial supervisor aiming at controlling the system to
prevent global crisis as generalized default.
The results here presented constitute a first step of a
wider research program. In particular, in future works we
shall consider sequence of checking times each of which
characterized by possibly different constraints to be con-
sidered by the supervisor. In this setting, a solution can
be obtained by a backward induction approach, see [7],
applied to results here derived. Moreover, as a further
development it can be considered a framework where the
failure can happen continuously in time, hence imposing
strict constraints at any time before the terminal one T .
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A General framework for systemic risk in finan-
cial networks
Let us first introduce the mathematical notation needed
to properly treat the general financial scenario we are
interested in. In particular, we consider a finite con-
nected financial network identified with a graph G com-
posed by n ∈ N vertices v1, . . . , vn, corresponding to n
banks, and m ∈ N edges e1, . . . , em assumed to be nor-
malized on the interval [0, 1], which represents interac-
tion between the n banks. In what follows we will use
the Greeks letters α, β, γ = 1, . . . ,m to denote edges,
whereas i, j, k = 1, . . . , n, will denote vertexes. We refer
to [9,10,14], for further details
The structure of the graph is based on the incidence ma-
trix Φ := Φ+ − Φ−, where the sum is intended compo-
nentwise and Φ = (φi,α)n×m, together with the incom-
ing incidence matrix Φ+ =
(
φ+i,α
)
n×m, and the outgoing
incidence matrix Φ− =
(
φ−i,α
)
n×m, where
φ+i,α =
{
1 vi = eα(0) ,
0 otherwise
, φ−i,α =
{
1 vi = eα(1) ,
0 otherwise .
In particular, we will say that the edge eα is incident to
the vertex vi if |φi,α| = 1, so that
Γ(vi) = {α ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : |φi,α| = 1} ,
represents the set of incident edges to the vertex vi. We
also introduce the adjacency matrix I = (ιi,j)n×n, de-
fined as I := I+ + I−, where I+ = (ι+i,j)n×n, resp.
I− = (ι−i,j)n×n, is the incoming adjacency matrix, resp.
outgoing adjacency matrix, defined as
ι+i,j =
{
1 it exists α = 1, . . . ,m : vj = eα(1) , vi = eα(0) ,
0 otherwise ,
ι−i,j =
{
1 it exists α = 1, . . . ,m : vj = eα(0) , vi = eα(1) .
0 otherwise .
Notice that since I+ = (I−)T , then we have that I is
symmetric with null entries on the main diagonal.
Above formulation can be used to represent the financial
network introduced in Section 2. In particular, to fully
specify the flow between each node in the network, we
introduce the notion of clearing vector representing the
payments made by each of the banks in the financial
system, see, e.g., [11, Definition 1], [16, Definition 2.6].
In what follows, if not otherwise specified, we will use
standard point-wise ordering for vectors in Rn, namely
for every x, y ∈ Rn it holds x ≤ y if and only of xi ≤ yi,
for any i = 1, . . . , n.
Definition 4 In the aforementioned financial setting,
see also appendix A, a clearing vector is a vector u∗(t) ∈
[0, u¯(t)] satisfying
• Limited liabilities:
u∗i (t) ≤
n∑
j=1
piTi,j(t)u
∗
j (t) + F
i(t) , i = 1, . . . , n ;
• Absolute priority: that is either obligations are paid
in full, or all value of the node is paid to creditors, i.e.
u∗i (t) =
{
u¯i(t), if u¯i(t) ≤
∑n
j=1 pi
T
i,j(t)u
∗
j (t) + F
i(t)∑n
j=1 pi
T
i,j(t)u
∗
j (t) + F
i(t), otherwise.
Existence and uniqueness of a clearing vector, in the
sense of Definition 4, is treated in [11,16]. In particular,
in [11] it is shown that u∗(t) is a clearing vector if and
only if
u∗(t) = u¯i(t) ∧
 n∑
j=1
piTi,j(t)u
∗
j (t) + F
i(t)
 . (A.1)
Equation (A.1) can be interpreted as follows: the
term u¯i(t) specifies which i − node owes to the other
nodes at time t ∈ [0, T ], whereas the second term(∑n
j=1 (pii,j(t))
T
u∗j (t) + F
i(t)
)
represents the cash in-
flow for the node i at time t ∈ [0, T ]. Consequently,
clearing vector represents the payment at time t of each
node: each node pays the minimum between what it has
and what it owes.
A.1 PageRank
Previously introduced notation allows also to derive an
explicit method to address relative importance of a sin-
gle node in a network. In particular, such an approach
has been used in Section 4 to systematically decide the
survival probability for each node.
Let us note that, along previous sections, we have stated
an optimal control problem which has been then solved
deriving its solution under the assumption that the ac-
cepted probability of failure qi is a fixed parameter to
be chosen endogenously. In what follows we propose a
general, automatic, criterion to deduce the global im-
portance of each node in the system. Next computations
exploit results on network analysis already used, e.g., to
set the functioning logic of the Google research engine,
see, e.g., [15]. According to the network formulation in-
troduced in Section 2, and using results derived in [15],
we show how to score the relative importance of any
bank in the network, computing its so called Page Rank,
allowing us to choose the best survival probability q.
According to the framework described in Section 2, see
also Appendix A, let us consider a system of intercon-
nected n banks and related standard bank enumeration.
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Namely, we take into account the usual one-to-one corre-
spondence relation between the set of banks and the set
of vertexes V := {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, referred to as nodes,
while I := {1, 2, . . . , n} is the associated set of indexes.
Moreover, consider a LOLR strategy in which for each
vi ∈ V the default probability constraint parameter qi
depends on a predetermined rank Ri associated to the
ith bank, hence representing its systemic importance in
the network.
In what follows we are considering graphs as defined in
Section 2. In particular, to each node vi ∈ V corresponds
a bank, while to edges connecting nodes (vi, vj) ∈ V ×V ,
we associate the following quantities
γ+(i,j) =
c+ Li,j + c
− Lj,i
Nj −min(N) + 1 , γ
−
(i,j) =
c+ Lj,i + c
− Li,j
Ni −min(N) + 1 ,
(A.2)
where, letting
L+j =
∑
i∼j
Lij , L
−
j =
∑
i∼j
Lji, (A.3)
i ∼ j ⇐⇒ vi, vj are connected,
we defineNj as the net amount of money held by bank j if
it would pay its debts at the actual time, i.e. Nj := Xj+
L+j −L−j . Moreover c+ and c− are two non-negative con-
stants chosen to confer more importance to due debts,
resp. to owed credits. For the sake of simplicity, since
c+ and c− are meant to be weight parameters, we set
c+ + c− = 1. Notice that γ+(i,i) = γ
−
(i,i) = 0 and γ
−
(i,j) =
γ+(j,i), for all i, j ∈ I.
Let us introduce the notion of outdegree deg+γ , resp. in-
degree deg−γ , for any vertex vi ∈ V , namely
deg+γ (vi) =
∑
j∈I
γ+(i,j), deg
−
γ (vi) =
∑
j∈I
γ−(i,j) ,
and normalize the quantities defined in (A.2) associated
to any couple (i, j) of edges in the graph
−→τ (i,j) =
γ+(i,j)
deg+γ (vj)
, ←−τ (i,j) =
γ−(i,j)
deg−γ (vj)
corresponding to the ratio of a linear combination on the
liabilities between bank i and bank j, and the asset value
of bank j. Moreover, we define the matrix
−→T as the ma-
trix whose entries are −→τ (i,j), for i, j ∈ I, the quantities−→τ (i,j) being the weights assigned to each oriented edge.
Therefore, the rating value associated to any node/bank
vi is given by the following recursive formula
Rid = d
∑
j∼i
−→τ (i,j)Rjd, (A.4)
where d ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter to be chosen, typically
d = 0.85, see, e.g., [14]. To compute equation (A.4), we
introduce the so called Google-matrix, see, e.g., [14, ch
2].
We assume that our network is composed by banks not
solely owing liabilities if c+ = 1, resp. not solely own-
ing liabilities if c+ = 0, and at least connected for c+ ∈
(0, 1). Of course, banks that are non connected to oth-
ers belonging to the network, are simply not ranked,
since their default cannot affect the system. On the other
hand, even if the conditions for c+ ∈ {0, 1} are not re-
quired, they guarantee the boundedness of all the ele-
ments of the matrix defined in the next Definition 5. We
stress that, to avoid above restrictions, one can modify
the values assigned to edges by equation (A.2), e.g., as
follows: for c+ = 1 and for every i ∼ j, define γ˜+(i,j) =
Li,j/(Nj−min(N)+1)+ as the modified value assigned
to the edges.
Definition 5 (Google-matrix) Let J be a n × n-
matrix whose entries are all ones. A Google-matrix is a
n× n-matrix given by
Gd := 1− d
n
J + d
−→T , (A.5)
where d ∈ (0, 1) can be chosen to guarantee irreducibility
of Gd, while J is the n× n matrix whose all entry are 1.
Since the matrix defined in equation (A.5) is positive we
can apply the Perron–Frobenius Theorem which assures
us that there exists a maximum real eigenvalue λ > 0 of
Gd, indeed λ is the so-called dominant Perron–Frobenius
eigenvalue. Moreover, there exists one of the associated
eigenvectors, denoted by Rd and usually called Perron-
Frobenius dominant vector, which is both strictly pos-
itive and normalized and whose components represent
the rating of each bank. Let us recall that d is usually
chosen to be approximately equals to 0.85, see, e.g., [14].
It follows that proposed ranking procedure consists in
computing the following series
Rd = d
∞∑
k=0
(1− d)k (Gd)k 1 ,
where we denoted by 1 a n-dimensional vector whose
entries are all equal to one.
B Comparison with the paper by Capponi et al.
[6]
As mentioned above, the financial setting has been
mainly borrowed by [11] as concerns the lending system
formulation, and from [6] for the optimal control prob-
lem with an external supervisor aiming at guaranteeing
the overall sanity of the system. This section is devoted
to a comparison with [6].
10
We stress that our assumptions on the optimal control
are in the spirit of [6], in the sense that we consider fail-
ure at discrete times; also we will not consider a global
optimal control, deriving a control for the whole time
interval but rather we derive a series optimal control
and then gluing together the resulting optimal controls.
As mentioned we leave the optimal global control to
future research being this latter point mathematically
more demanding.
This comparison is significant since their work is based
on a similar framework, namely a multi-period con-
trolled system of banks, represented by a network, in
which an outside entity, named LOLR, provides liq-
uidity assistance loans to financially unstable banks in
order to reduce the level of systemic risk within the
whole network of banks. To analyze the systemic risk in
interbank networks their work follows a clearing system
framework consistent with bankruptcy laws. In partic-
ular they generalize the single period clearing system
in the paper by Eisenberg and Thomas, see [11], by
a multi-period controlled clearing payment system as-
suming limited liability of equity, priority over equity,
and proportional repayments of liabilities after the de-
fault event. This generalization leads to a better insight
in the propagation and aftershocks of defaults.
The main feature in [6] is the comparison between two
possible LOLR strategies:
• the Systemic Importance Driven (SID) strategy, in
which liquidity assistance is available only to banks
considered systemically important, i.e. the banks
whose default would cause significant losses to the fi-
nancial system (because of their size, complexity and
systemic interconnectedness);
• the Max-Liquidity (ML) strategy, in which the regula-
tors aim to maximize the instantaneous total liquidity
of the system.
By the analysis of these two different strategies they
showed that the SID strategy is preferred when the net-
work has a core-periphery structure, i.e. consisting of a
dense cohesive core and a sparse, loosely connected pe-
riphery. This is due by the fact that the ML strategy
increases the default probability for systematically im-
portant banks. Although these two strategies are sim-
plified and do not consider the amount of capital that
the LOLR has to inject in the banks network, nonethe-
less such comparison is useful because the numerical ap-
proach fits easily through simulations and systemic risk
analysis.
Our work has some important similarities with the one
by Capponi et al., in particular we also have considered
a finite connected multi-period financial network repre-
senting the banks system and the assumptions guaran-
teeing the consistency with the bankruptcy laws. But,
despite this, instead of comparing the two strategies,
SID and ML, we considered a LOLR wishing to min-
imize the square of the lend resources over the proba-
bilistic constraint. Therefore, we did not gave an initial
budget at disposal to the LOLR as in [6], but took into
consideration regulators aiming to find the loan con-
trol {αi(t)}i=1,...,N,t∈[tk,tk+1] minimizing the functional
given by equation (5) for each time interval, i.e. ∀k =
1, . . . ,M − 1, ensuring that the probability for each ex-
ogenous asset value to be greater than the default bound-
ary is greater than a given constants qi for each bank
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Moreover, while [6] is meant to compare two strategies
for the LOLR, our approach follows a different path in
searching the optimal budget consumption to guaran-
tee a prescribed level of safety of the financial network,
given by the parameters qi i = 1, . . . , N . In particular,
we do not assume strong constraint over the regulators
budget, which depends on the default probability con-
straint parameters qi. To switch on a similar compari-
son as in [6], i.e. considering banks networks of the type
core-periphery and baseline random networks, and regu-
lator policies of the type SID and ML, it suffices to fix
the probability constraint depending on the systematic
importance of the banks. That is, banks whose failure
would cause significant losses to the financial network,
because of their size and systemic interconnectedness,
should be endorsed with greater default probability pa-
rameters qi. Therefore, our study provides an extension
of the admissible policies, through considering an opti-
mal control theory approach.
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